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1. lNTRODUCTJON 
At the heart of the arbitral process are its procedures. lt is 
often, and rightly, said that it is the procedurZ�l conduct of 
international arbitral proceedings, as much as any other factor, that 
leads parties to agree to arbitrate their disputes. 
In particular, parties agree to arbitrate their international 
disputes with the objective of obtaining fair and neutral procedures 
which are flexible, efficient, and capable of being tailored to the 
needs of their particular dispute, without reference to the 
formalities and technicalities of procedural rules applicable in 
national courts.1 These objectives are principally pursued tlu·ough 
. Mr. Born is the author of lNTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2008) 
and INTERNATIONAL ClV!L LiTIGATION IN UNITF.O STATES COURTS (4th ed. 2006). This 
Article is based on discussions of similar issues in GARY l30RN, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2009). Unless otherwise noted all translations 
are by the author. The author gratefully acknowledges tbe assistance of Leila 
Abolfazli and Jason Fisher. 
t See 1 GARY BORI\:, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 64-90 (2d ed. 
2009) (discussing parties' objectives upon entering international arbitration 
agreements). Not all international arbitrations are necessarily designed to achieve 
every one of these objectives. For example, arbih·ations may be conducted in one 
party's home jurisdiction, pursuant to the domestic procedural rules of that 
jurisdictjon. Nonetheless, in n.1ost instances, parties enter into international 
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the substantial autonomy that parties enjoy, under intern.ational 
arbitration conventions and developed national arbitration 
legislation, to agree upon arbitral procedures, and the broad 
d iscretion that arbitrators are granted by the same sources to 
prescribe arbitral procedures (absent contrary agreen1ent by the 
parties).2 The parties' procedural autonomy and the arbitrators' 
procedural discretion figure centrally in most discussions of the 
arbitral process. 
ln addition to addressing the content of the procedures that are 
used in international arbitrations, leading international arbitration 
conventions and national arbitration legislation also adopt a basic 
principle of judicial non-interference in the ongoing conduct of the 
arbitral proceedings. This principle of judicial non-interference in 
international arbitral proceedings is often overlooked. 
Nonetheless, the principle is fundamentally important to the 
efficacy of the international arbitral process, ensuring that an 
arbitration can proceed, pursuant to the agreement of the parties or 
under the direction of the tribunal, without the delays, second­
guessing, and other problems associated with interlocutory judicial 
review of procedural decisions. This Article addresses both the 
background of the principle of judicial non-interference and its 
legal bases in the New York Convention (and other international 
arbitration conventions) and in national arbitration legislation. 
commercial arbitration agreements with the objective of achieving all or most of 
these ends. 
2 Similar objectives exist in the context of state-to-state arbitrations. See Int'l 
L. Comm'n., Memorandum on Arbitral Procedure, [1950] 2 Y.B. lnt'l Comm'n 157, 
U.N. Doc. A/CNA/35/1950 (reviewing the procedures used in contemporary 
state-to-state arbitrations and their objectives); Inst. Int'l L., Projet de Reglement 
pour Ia Procedure Arbitrale Internationale [Project for the Creation of International 
Arbitration Procedures], art. 15 (A ug. 28, 1875), available at http:// www.idi 
-iil.org/ idiF / resolutionsF /1875_haye_Ol_fr.pdf; see also Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes arts. 37-90, Jul. 29, 1899, 2 U.S.T. 2016 
(outlining arbitral procedure that governs signatories, unless other rules are 
agreed upon by the parties); James Crawford, Advocacy Before the International 
Court of Justice and Other International Tribunals in State-to-State Cases, in THE ART OF 
ADVOCACY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 11, 13 (R. Doak Bishop ed., 2004) 
(describing historic use of a "combination of full written and oral phases" of 
arbitration). 
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I 0BJECT1V£S OF ARBlTRAL PROCEDURES lN lNTERNA TlONAL 
ARBITRA TION 
One of the fundan1ental objectives of most international 
commercial cnbitrations is procedural neutrality.?> International 
disputes almost inevitably involve parties from different home 
jurif'dictions (i.e., a Kuwaiti company, with procedural experience 
and expectations rooted in Islam.ic law and culture, con tractjng 
with a French company, whose procedural experience and 
expectations wm be based upon contemporary European civil law 
procedures). Naturally, some parties wilJ be more 'l international'' 
than others, and have greater or lesser expectations that the 
procedures of their own home Jurisdiction will necessarily apply in 
future disputes. But one of the fundamental objective of 
international arbitration is to ensure that (unless the parties agree 
otherwise) disputes will not be resolved in Clccordance with the 
procedures of one party's-and not tbe other party's-home 
jurisdiction, which may favor, explicitly or implicitly, one party 
over the other. The objective of procedm:al neutrality is an 
expression of the basic equality of  the pcuties, lying at the heart of 
their efforts to achieve a neutral, objective tneans of international 
dispute resolution and guaranteed by leading international 
arbitration conventions and national arbitration legislatjon.4 
A closely related objective of intexnational commercial 
arbitration is pxocedural fairness. Parties agree to international 
arbitration, anwng other things, in order to obtain fair and 
objective procedures guaranteeing both parties an equal 
opportunity to be heard. This objective is inherent in the 
adjudicative character of international arbitration, in which the 
arbitrators are obligated to decide the parties' dispute impartially 
and objectively, based upon the law and the evidence presented by 
3 See, e.g., Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 
801, 2007 SCC 34, � 51 (Can.) ("The neutrality of arbitration . . .  is one of the 
fundamental characteristics of this alternative dispute resolution mechanism . . . .  
[A]rbitration is an institution without a forum and without a geographic basis."). 
•l See Convention on the R ecognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards art. V( l)(b), June 10, 1958, 21 U. S . T. 2518, 330 U.N. T. S .  38 [hereinafter 
New York Convention] (permitting the refusal to recognize and enforce an 
arbitral e1ward wherE! the parties ore not on equal footing because the party 
against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
proceedi.ngs or was otherwise unable to present a case); MODEL LAW ON lNT'L 
COMMERCIAL A RBITRATION art. 18 (1985) [hereinafter UNClTRA L, MODEL LAW] 
("The parties shall be treated with equality . . . . ") . 
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the parties.s This objective is implemented by the terms of  both 
international arbjtration conventions and nabonal arbitration 
legislation, both of which guar<lntee the parties' procedural rights.6 
Beyond neutrality and fairness, parties agree to international 
arbitr<�tion with the objective of obtaining dispute resolution 
procedures that strea mline the nrbitral proceedings and allow a 
speedy, dficient, and expert result.' This objective is facilitated by 
the n1inimal scope that is permitted for judicial review of arbitral 
a wards and other decisions by the mbitrators -a legal regime 
under which the pmties exchange the safeguards of appellate 
review for the bene.fits of speed, economy, and finality. This 
retlects businessmen and businesswomen's desires for certainty of 
resu Its and efficiency of procedures, as well ClS skepticism about 
the possibiliti� o£ achiev ing "correct'' or "perfecto results through 
multiple layers of appellate rev iew in nalional courts. 
[nternational arbitration is a lso designed with the objective of 
avojding the formalities and techruce1lities that are associated with 
many national l itigation systems. Arbitration is  chosen by 
in ternational businessmen and businessvvomen in order to provide 
conunercially sensible and praclical resolutions to cross-border 
conlnlercial disputes. This perm i ts-indeed, requires-dispensing 
with ntany of the procedural protections that are designed for 
don1estic litigation irwolving individual litigants, and instead 
adopting procedures that wil l achieve com .. mercially practicable 
results. 
A close1y related objective of j n ternational arbitration is the use 
ot a.rbih·al procedures that are flexible and tailored to the parties' 
5 See 2 BORN, supra note 1, at 1742-44 ("One of the fundamental objectives of 
most international commercial arbitrations is procedural neutrality."). 
r, fd.; New York Convention, s11prn note 4, art. V(l)(b) (allowing the non­
enforcement of an award where one party was 1.mable to present a case); 
UNClTRAL, MODEL LAW art. 18 (stating that "each party shall be given a full 
opportunity of presenting his case") .  
7 See 1 BORN, supm note 1,  at 66 (noting that parties usually agree on 
arbitration because i t  provides efficiency in resolving a future dispute); Ballentine 
Books, Inc. v. Capital Distrib. Co., 302 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1962) ( " A  fortiori an 
arbitrator should act affirmatively to simplify and expedite the proceedings before 
him, since among the virtues of arbitration which presumably have moved the 
parties to agree upon it are speed and informality."); Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 
33 (Eng.) (imposing duty on the trib1..mal to ''adopt procedures suitable to the 
circumstances of the particular case, avoidit)g unnecessary delay or expense, so as 
to provide a f<tir means for the resolution of the matters failing to be 
lletermined'1). 
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particular dispute and mutual desires.s This is well described in 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(''UNCITRAL") Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceeding: 
This [procedural flexibj]ity] is useful in that i t  enables the 
arbitral tTibunal to Lake decisions on the organization of 
proceedings that take into account the circumstances of the 
case, the expectations of the pcu-ties and of tlle members of 
the arbitral tribLmat and the need for a just and cost­
efficient resolution of lhe dlsputeY 
Indeed, this procedural freedom Clnd flexibi l i ty is one of the 
essential foundations of lhe arbitral process: 
[U]nlike the position in court, ·vvhen both the parties and the 
tribunal are governed by fixed procedural rules which will 
be generally adversarial in character, in arbitrations the 
mutual functions of the parties' lawyers and the tribunal 
tend to be complementary and co-operational, at least on 
the surface. Although often coming from different cultures 
aJ.'ld legal philosophies, they must work, and to son1e extent 
live, together b-orn the beginning to the end of each case, 
with i n termittent hearings in hotels or other locations 
which may cover periods. of weeks, interspersed with 
periods of correspondence. During this process they n1ust 
largely fashion their own procedure. They 111ust perforce 
get to know and show respect for each other, and make 
s See 1 BORN, supra note 1, at 414 (noting that parties get to select their 
procedural law by agreement); Emmanuel Gaillard & Philippe Pinsolle, Advocacy 
in International Commercial Arbitratio11: France, in THE ART OF ADVOCACY IN 
lNTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 2, al 133, 133 (' 'International 
arbitration . .. gives the parties and their counsels the widest possible range of 
options."); GEORGIOS PETROCHfLOS, PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION para. 3.73 (2004) ("[M]odern law affords arbitrating parties and 
arbitral tribtmals wide freedom to fashion the procedural rules of the 
proceedings. ''); Robert Pietrowski, Evidence i11 International ArbitrntiO!'l, 22 ARB. 
TNT'L 373, 374 (2006) ("[T]he procedure of most international tribunals is 
characterized by an absence of restrictive rules governing the form, submission 
and admissibility of evidence."). 
9 U.N. Comm'n on Tnt'l Trade Law [UNOTRAL], UNClTRAL Notes on 
Organizing Arbitral Proceedings � 4, available nt http) /www uncitral.orgl uncitral 
1 en/ uncitral_textsl arbitrationll996Notes_proceedings.hbnl; see also UNCITRJ\ L, 
Report of the UNCJTRAL on tl1e Work of its Twe1'1ty-Ni11flt Session, �[ 15, U.N. Doc. 
Al51l17 (Aug. 14, 1996), availnbl!! at http:lldaccessdds:.un.org/dociUNDOC 
IGENIN96I206j41IPDF I N962064l.pd(?OpenE1ernent. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
1004 U. Pn. ]. Int'l L. [Vol .  30:4 
allowances for different points of view, with both the 
lawyers and the h·ibunal constantly trying to ensu re as 
much harmony as circ u mstances may permit.1D 
The tailoring of procedures to a particular case may involve 
establishing an expedited " fast-track" arbitral procedure, or 
emphasizing particular types of evidence (e.g., technical, s ite 
inspection), or employing im1ovahve evidence-taking procedures 
(e. g., witness-conferencing, meetings of experts) .  Alternatively, it 
may involve using relatively conventional litigation procedures, 
much l ike those in some national courts, to hear the parties' 
submissions and evidence. In a l l  cases, however, the parties' 
autonomy and the tribunal's discretion are intended to be used to 
adopt procedures designed to permit the most efficient, reliable, 
and sensible presentation of the parties' evidence and arguments in 
a particular case. 
3. PARTIES' PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 
One of the most fundamental characteristics of i nternational 
commercial  arbitration is the parties' freedom to agree upon the 
arbitral procedure. This principle is acknowledged i n  the New 
York Convention and other major international arbitration 
conventions. The principle is guaranteed by arbitration statutes in 
virtually all  developed jurisdictions and it is  contained in  and 
facilitated by the rules of most leading arbitral institutions. The 
principle of the parties' procedural autonomy is qua lified only by 
the mandatory requirements of applicable national law and, under 
most developed arbitration statutes, even these requirements are 
ordinarily l imited in scope. 
3.1. Parties' Procedural Autonomy under International Arbitration 
Corzven tions 
Leading international arbitration conventions uniformly 
recognize and give effect to the parties' autonomy to determine the 
arbitral procedures.11 Most importantly, the New York Convention 
10 Michael Kerr, Concord nnd Conflict in In ternational Arbitration, 13 ARB. INT'L 
121, 125 (1997). 
11 The Geneva Protocol required that "the arbitral procedure, including the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, shall be governed by the will of the parties 
and by the law of the country in whose territory the arbitration takes place." 
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gives effect lo the central role of the parties' autonomy to fashion 
the arbitration procedure, and provides for the non-recognition of 
awards following proceedings tl.1at failed to adhere to the pa rti es ' 
agreed procedures. Thus, Article V(l)(d) of the Convention 
permits non-recognition of an arbitral award if " [t]he composition 
of the arbitral au thority or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreen1ent of the parties, or, failing such 
agreentent, was not 1n accordance with the law of the country 
where the arbitration took place."t2 Article V(l)(d) is of vital 
importance because i t  recognizes, in explicit tenus, the parties' 
au tonomy to agree upon the arbih·al proceduresJ including 
procedures different from those prescribed by the laws of the 
arbitral seat: where the parties have made such an agreen1cnt, 
Article V(1)(d) requires, in effect, that their agree1nent be followed, 
notwithstanding contrary procedural rules in the seat of the 
arbitration. As one coaunentator correctly puts it, "Article V(I)(d) 
simply makes party autonomy the sole determinant i n  matters 
procedurat the only limit to such autonomy at the enforcement 
stage being subparagraph (b) of the same paragraph, which reflects 
the principles of natural justice.''n Even more directly, and 
appl icable outside the recognition context Article II of the 
Convention requires courts of Contracting States to recognize valid 
arbitration agreements and refer the parties to arbih·ation pursuant 
to such agreements.14 This obligation extends to all n1aterial terms 
of an agreement to arbitrate-including the parties' agreement 
regarding arbitral seat, number of arbitrators, institutional rules, 
and arbitral procedures.1s 
Properly understood1 Article I I  thus requires Contracting States 
to give effect to agreements regarding arbitral procedures. As 
Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses art. 2, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 LN.T.S. 157 
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol]. This provision was generally understood as 
requiring compliance with the procedural law of the arbitral seat. See 1 BORN, 
suprn note 1, at 1253-54. 
n New York Convention, supra note 4, art. V(1)(d). 
l3 PETROCHILOS, supm note 8, para. 8.4.1; see also Gaillard & Pinsolle, supra 
note 81 at 133 (discussing parties' freedom to choose the venue, arbitrators, and 
applicab1e procedural rules); MAITIS KURKELA & t-'IANNES SNELLMANN, DUE 
PROCESS IN lNTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 84-86 (2005) (discussing 
non-respect as a violation of due process). As discussed above, this contrasts with 
Article 2 of the Geneva Protocol and Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. See 
sllpm note 11 and accompanying text. 
ld New York Convention, ::.upra note 4, arts. Il(1), ll(3). 
15 See 1 BORN, supra note 1. at 567-69. 
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d iscussed above, this obligation is subject to a limited exception 
where the parties' procedural agreement violates mandatory 
national public policies guaranteeing an opportunity to be heard or 
equal ity of treatment. Althou gh it is beyond the scope of this 
Essay, even in these l imited cases, the Convention should be 
interpreted as imposing international l imits on the extent to which 
mandatory national procedural requirements may override the 
parties' procedural autonomy .16 
Even more directly, but to the same effect the European 
Convention provides in Article IV(l) (b) ( iii)  that parties shall be free 
" to lay down the procedure to be followed by the a rbitrators. " 17 
The Inter-American Convention similarly pro vides i n  Articles 2 
and 3 that the arbitration shall be conducted according to the 
" agreement of the p arties ." 1s These provisions affirm, in more 
d irect and mandatory term s  than the language of the New York 
Convention, the parties' procedural autonomy in international 
arbitration. 
3.2. Parties' Procedural Autonomy under National Arbitration 
Legislation 
Arbitration legislation in  most major 
implements the proviSIOns of the New York 
parallel international arbitration conventions) 
trading nations 
Convention (and 
by guaranteeing 
16 See id. In particular, the Convention imposes structural l imits on the 
application of idiosyncratic or discriminatory local public policies (such as rules 
requiring that all arbitrators be local nationals, that local language be used in all 
arbitral proceedings, or that all arbitral proceedings be conducted on local 
terri tory) . 
17 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961 art. 
IV(1) (b) (iii), Apr. 21 , 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364 [hereinafter European Convention] . 
Article IV(4) (d) also provides that, where the parties have not agreed upon the 
arbitral procedure, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the arbitral rules. See 2 
BORN, supra note 1 ,  at 1758-60. Like Article V(1) (d) of the New York Convention, 
Article IX(l) (d) of the European Convention provides for the non-recognition of 
arbitral awards if the procedure followed by the tribunal departed from that 
agreed upon by the parties. 
18 Article 2 of the Inter-American Convention provides that the arbitrators 
shall be appointed " in a manner agreed upon by the parties." Inter-American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration art. 2, Jan. 30, 1975, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 42 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention] . Article 3 provides 
that " [i)n the absence of an express agreement between the parties, the arbitration 
shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Inter­
An1erican Com.mercial Arbitration Commission." Id. art. 3. 2 BORN, supra note 1 ,  
at 1758-60. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/22
2009] jUDICIAL NON-INTERFERENCE PRINCIPLE 1007 
parties the freedom to agree mutually upon the procedural rules 
governing the. cm1dnct o[ the arbitrntio11 (subject only to li.mlted 
mandatory restrictions of national law).19 The UNCITRAL Model 
Law provides, in Article 19(1), that "[s]ubject to the provisions of 
this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be 
followed by the nrb i tral tribunal in conducting the proceedjngs."20 
More specifically, the parties' freedom to agree upon various 
matters relating to the presentation of their cases and the taking oJ 
evidence is expressly recognized in Articles 18, 19(1) and 24(1) of 
the Model Law.21 
Similarly, Arbde '182(1) of the Swiss Law on Private 
lnternational Law provides that "[t]he parties may, directly or by 
reference to rules of arbitration, detennine tbe arbitral procedure; 
they m.ay also submit the arbitral procedure to a procedural law of 
their choice."22 Other arbitration legislation in developed 
jurisdictions is sin1ilar, including in England,23 France,24 
19 See 2 BORN, supra note 1, at 1751-53; Thomas I I. Webstet, Party Control in 
Inlemnlionnl 1\rbitmtioll, 19 ARB. lNT'L 119, 1 19  (2003) ("Parties determine the 
applicable law and arbitri::l tion rules . . . .  ");Pierre Lalive, On file Ncrtfmli�t vf the 
Arbitmlor and of flw PlnCt' lif Arbilratiull, in SWISS ESSAYS ON fNT£RNATlONAL 
ARBITRATION 23, 29 (1984) (" [M]odern lc1w of international arbitration today leaves 
a wide autonomy to th� parties with regard to procedme (subject onJy to 
universally recognized fundamental guarantees of fairness and equality),"). 
20 UNCJTRAL, MODEL LAW, supm note 4, art. 19(1). The drafting history of 
the Model Law confirms the parties' procedural autonomy in emphatic terms, 
''probably tire most important principle on which the model law should be based is 
the freedom of the parties in order to facilitate the proper functioning of the 
international commercial arbitrations according to their expectations." Report of 
the Secretary-General on Possible Feat II res of 11 Model Law on 111 temational Commercial 
Arbitration, 12 Y.B. on lnt'l Trad� L. 78, ,j17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/207 (1981) 
(emphasis added). 
21 See UNCTTRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, arts. 18, 19(1), 24(1 ), 
U.N. Doc. A/ RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976) ("Each party shall have the burden of 
proving the facts relied on to support his claim or defence."). 
22 Loi Federate sur Je Droit International Prive [RS] [FederaJ Statute on 
Private ]nternational Law] Dec. 18, 1987, RS 291, art. 182(1) (Switz.), reprillted in 
Swiss Chambers' Court of Arbitration and Mediation (Marc Blessing et al .  h·ans.), 
https://www.sccam.org/sajdownloadjTPRG_english.pdf. For commentary on 
Article 182, see Michael E. Schneider, Article 182, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
IN SWTTZERLAND: AN INTRODUCTION TO AND A COMMENTARY ON ARTICLES 176-194 OF 
THE SWISS PRIVATE ll\lTERNATIONAL LAW STATUTE 395 (Stephen V. Berti ed., 2000). 
23 See Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § l(b) (Eng.) (''[T]he parties should be free 
to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are 
necessary in the public interest."); id, § 33 (outlining the general duties of the 
tribunal in arbitral proceedings); irt. § 34 (describing the treatment of procedural 
and evidentiary matters before an <lrbilral tribunal). See also ROBERT MERKIN, 
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Germany/:; Belgium,:!" Austrid,27 japan,:!s Sing2lpore,2\J and 
clsewhere)O In the United States, the statutory text of the Federal 
AR�rrRATIO:-J ACT1996 11�1 '14.1-1-!.3-.l (3rd cd., ::wos & rev. 2007) (noting that "[t]hc 
parties are free to agree when e1rbitr,1l proceeding" c1re to be regarded a:; 
commenced"). 
24 Sec Decree No. 81-500 of :vtny l2, l98J, Jovrnol Officil!l de la Republique 
Fran<;aise U.O.j [Official Gazette of Francel, May 14, 1981, p. 1398, reprinted iu 
Nouveau Code de Pmcedure Civile [f\:.C.P.C.J art. 1494, rrvailnble nf 
http:/ jwwvv.legifrance.gouv.fr/afCichCode.do?cid-rexlt"''LECITEXt000006070716 
&dateTexte=20090412) ("The arbih·ation agret>mcnt may, directly or by way of 
reference to a resnlution bv arbitration, luy do\vn the procedure to be followed in 
the col!rse of the <1rbitr<�tio-n proceeding; it rnay abo bJ:ing the latter under the l<1w 
applicable to procedur.:�l rrwtters th<1t it �lelermint.'s.''). Sec ni!'tl Caill<�rd & PinsoJle, 
f;llpm note 8, at -134 ("French luw pla1ces no llmitatitlll upun the parties' and the 
arbitrators' freedom."). 
:!S See Zivilprozel.Sordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute] January 1, 1998, 
Bu ndesgesetzblatt. Teil l [ BCBI. lL § 1 042(J) (F.R.G.) ("Furthermore, Stl bject to the 
mandatory provisions of thi� book the parties may cl1oose the procedure 
themselves or by reference to institution,, I arbitral rules.''); ;;t.'L' nl�t> Peter Schlosser, 
in 9 KOMMENTAR ZUI{ ZIVILPRQZESSORDNUNG [Commentary on Civil Procedure 
Law] § 1042, � .3 (Fortgefi.ihrt Von Friedrich Stein & Martin jonas eds., 2.002). 
2r, See Judicial Code, art. 1693(1) (Belg.) ("Without prejudice to the provisions 
of Article 1694, the parties m<1y decide on the rules of the arbitral procedure ..  
. " ). 
'27 See ZivilprozesSLlrdt1ung [ZPOj [Ci\'il Procedure Statute) § 594(1) (AuslTia), 
translated in Cl-!R1STOPHEI\ LlEBSCHER, T! IE AL1STWAN ARBlTRAT[QN ACT 2006: TEXl 
Al'-TD Nons (Kluwer L21w lnt'l ed. 2006) ("Subject to the mandatory provisions of 
this Section, the parties are free to determ[ne on the rules of procedure. The 
parties may thereby refer other rules of pro(edure."); Herbert Hausmaninger, ill 2 
KOMMENTAR ZU DEN ZIVILPROZEgGESETZE § 594, �2 (1 L Fasching ed., 2007) ("This 
freedom of discretion i.s of central importance for arbitral proceedings in general 
and for international arbitral proceedings in particular.''). 
23 Arbitration Law, Law No. 138 of 2003, art. 26, no. 1 Oapan), trn11slnterf in 
Arbitration law Follow-Up Research Croup Arbitration Law, http:/ fwww.kantei 
.go.jp /foreign/ pol icy/ sihou/ arbitrationlaw.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) ("The 
parties are free to agree on the procedw·e to be followed by the �u:bitral tribunal in 
conducting the arbitral proceedings. Provided, it shall nol violate the provisions 
of this Law relating to public policy."). 
29 International Arbitration Act, 2002, Cb. 143A, § 15A(6) (Sing.), reprinted in 
lT A REPORTER (Michael Huang ed.) ("The parties may make the arrangements .. . 
by agreeing to the applicaUon or adoption oE rules of arbitraUon or by providing 
any other means by which a matter may be decided."). 
30 See, e.g., Voluntary Arbitration Act, art. 15(1), L. no. 31/863 (2003) (Port.) 
(noting that parties may agree on the rules of procedure); obcansky soudni fad 
c. 99/1963 Sb., art. 19 (Czech Rep.) (stating that under Article 19 parties are free to 
agree on the procedure); The Arbitrati'on and Conciliation Act, 1996, No. 26, Acts 
of Parliament, 1996 (India) (stating that under Article 19(2) parties are free to 
agree on the procedure used by the arbitral trihunal); Nomos (1999:2735) 
[lnte.rnational Commercial Arbitration Law], 2004, (Greece), See also European 
Convention Providing a Uniform Law on Arbitre1lion Annex art. J5(1), Jan. 20, 
1966, Euro. T S. No. 56 (''Without prejudice lo the provisions of t\rticle 16, the 
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Arbitration Act ("FAA" )  is si lent but jud icial decisions u niformly 
confirm the parties' freedom to agree upon the arbitral procedures 
(subject to very l imited requirements of p rocedural fairness) . 31 
The parties' autonomy with regard to procedural m.atters has 
been affirmed in emphatic terms by the Paris Cour d' appel :  
I t  has  been established that the a rbitration in question . . .  i s  
an international arbi tration governed by the intentions of  
the parties. In this case, the rules of domestic law have a 
purely subsidiary role and apply only in the absence of a 
s pecific agreemen t by the parties . . . the rules of the [ ICC] 
Court of Arbitration, which constitute the law of  the 
p arties, must be applied to the exclusion of all other lawsY 
A U.S. court observed, to similar effect, that " [p ] arties may 
choose to be governed by whatever rules they wish regarding how 
an arbitration itself will be conducted,"JJ while another remarked, 
more colorfully, that between competent p arties, even procedures 
such as " fl ipping a coin, or, for that matter, arm wrestling" are 
parties may decide on the rules of the arbitral procedure and on the place of 
arbitration. I f  the parties do not indicate their intention before the first arbitrator 
has accepted his office, the decision shall be a matter for the arbitrators." ) .  
31 See, e.g., UHC Mgmt. Co .  v .  Computer Scis. Corp., 148  F .3d 992, 995 (8th 
Cir. 1998) (noting that private agreements to arbitrate are usually enforced 
according to their terms); Glass Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int'l 
Union v .  Excelsior Foundry Co., 56 F.3d 844, 848 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that if 
there is a conflict between federal arbitration rules and state law, the federal law 
applies); Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v .  TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 
2004) (" [T]he FAA requires arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the 
parties '] agreemen t.") (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Baravati v .  
Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F .3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (" Indeed, short of  
authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a panel of three 
monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedures they want to govern the 
arbitration of their disputes . . . .  ") .  See also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v .  Bd. of Trustees, 
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (noting the FAA was designed to ensure that arbitration 
agreements that parties entered into were enforced); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 
Prefatory Note, 7 U.L.A. 2 (2000) (" [A]rbitration is a consensual process in which 
autonomy of the parties who enter into arbitration agreements should be given 
primary consideration, so long as their agreements conform to notions of 
fundamental fairness. This approach provides parties with the opportunity in 
most instances to shape the arbitration process to their own particular needs.") .  
32  Raffinerie de petrole d'Homs et de Banias v .  Chambre de commerce 
internationale, Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, May. 15, 1985, 
reprin ted in 1985 REV. ARB. 141 . 
33 UHC Mgm t. Co., 1 48 F.3d at 997. 
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enforceable.3� For their part, English authorities have upheld sui 
generis procedural mechanisms, such as selecting arbitra tors by 
drawing narnes by lot.JS 
(n contrast, i t  is virtually impossible to identify contetn.porary 
authority that denies or even questions the principle of the parties' 
procedural a u tonomy in international commercia1  arbitrations. At  
the same tin1e, however, a s  discussed below, the parties) a utonorny 
in all developed jurisdictions is subject to the limitations of 
mandatory national public policies regarding procedural matters.31i 
3.3. A rbitrlltors' Procedural Discretion in Jntcmationai A rbitmtio11 
Although leading i nternational arbi trettjon conventions and 
national law in most developed states perrnit parties to agree upon 
the arbitral procedures, subject only to minimal mandatory due 
process requirements) parties in practice oflen do not agree in 
advance on detailed procedural rules for their arbitra tion. Instead, 
arbitration agreements will ordinarily provide simply for 
arbitration pursuant to a set of institutional rules, which supply 
only a broad procedural framework. Filling in the considerable 
gaps in this framework will be Ieft to the subsequent agreement of 
the parties or, if they cannot agree, the arbitral tribunal. The 
arbitrators' discretion to determine the arbitral procedure, in the 
absence o£ agreement between the parties on such matters, is 
another one of the foundations of the international arbitral process. 
3.4. Arbitral Tribunal's Procedu ral Discretion unde·r International 
Arbitration Conventions 
Leading irtternational arbitration conventions confirn1 the 
arbitral tribunal's power, in the absence of agreement by the 
parties, to determine the arbitral procedures. Most explicitly, 
Article IV(4)(d) of the European Convention provides that, where 
34 Team Design v. Gottlieb, 104 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). 
Although vivid, it is not clear that entirely arbitrary or random procedures would 
be acceptable under most international and national law standards of due process 
and procedural fairness. [n particular, random chance or physical endurance 
would likely not provide either party with an opportunity to be heard in an 
adjudicative process, as required under most national and international 
arbitration regimes. See 2 BORN, s11pra note 1, at 1794-1873, for a general 
description of what procedures will be heard under international arbitration 
regimes. 
35 Iu re Shaw & Sims, [1851] 17 l.l.T.R. 160 (lr.). 
,r, See ir�fm notes 411-53 and accompanying text. 
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the parties have not agreed upon arbitral procedures, the tribunal 
may " establish directly or by reference to the rules and statutes of a 
permanent arbitral institution the rules of procedure to be followed 
by the arbitrator(s) . . . .  ";7 
The Inter-American Convention also expressly recognizes the 
arbitral tribunal's  procedural zruthority, albeit indirectly, providing 
in Article 3 that, '' [ i ]n  the absence of an exprE!ss agreement bet·ween 
the t'arties, the arbitration shall  be conducted in accordance with 
A 
the rules of proced ure of the Inter-American Commercial 
Arbitration Commission.' '31' In turn, Article 15 of the Inter­
A merican Comrnercial  A rbitrillion Commission ("fACAC") Rules 
grants the arbitrators broCld procedural authority, st1bject on ly to 
basic requirements of equality and fairness.3C) 
The New York Convention refers less directly to lhe arbitral 
tribunill' s power to determine the axbi h·al procedures, but 
produces the sarne result. The Convention makes no direct 
reference to the tribunal's authority to conduct the proceedings, 
only indirectly acknowledging such powers in Articles V(l)(b) and 
(d).40 At the same time, Article I1(3) of the Convention requires 
giving effect to the parties) agreement to arbitrate, an essential 
element of which is either express or .implied authorization to the 
arbitrators to conduct the arbitral proceed ings as they deem best 
(absent contrary agreement by the parties on specific matters).41 
Even where the tribunal's procedural authority is not expressly 
recognized in applicable international conventions, there can be no 
doubt as to the internationally-recognized status of such authority. 
An i nherent characteristic of the arbitral process is the tribunal's 
adjudicative role and responsibility for establishing and 
implementing the procedures necessary to resolve the parties1 
37 European Convention, supra note 17, art. IY(4)(d). 
38 lnter-American Convention, supra note 18, art. 3. 
39 lNTER-AM. COMMERCfAL ARBITRATION COMM'N R., art. 12(a) (2002), available 
at htlp:/ jwww.adr.org/ sp.asp?id=22093 ("Subject to these Rules, the arbitral 
tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as i t  considers appropriate, 
provided that the parties are h·eated with equality and that at any stage of the 
proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting his case."). 
�o New York Convention, supra note 4, arts. V(l)(b), V(l)(d) (stating that both 
Article V(1)(b) and V(l)(d) of the New York Convention provide grounds for 
nonrecognition of an award that presuppose the tribunal's power to determine 
arbitral procedmes in the ubsence of agreement by the parties). See 2 BORN, suprn 
note 1, at 2737-77. 
·11 Set' $11/'1'11 notes 1-2 and accompanying text; see also 2 BORN,suprn note l, at 
1776-77. 
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dispute. The tribunal's procedural authority is a n  impl ic i t  part of 
the parties' agreement to arbitrate�2 and is an indjspensable 
precondition for an effective Clrbitral process. Accord i ngly, just as 
Article [I of the New York Convention, and equiva lent provisions 
of other International cn-bjtration conventions, gu21rantee the 
parties' procedural autonomy/3 these conventions also guarantee 
the tribunal's authority over the arbitrc-d procedures (absent 
contrary agreement). As discussed below, the tribunal's authority 
is subject to restrictions, imposed by mandatory national lavvs 
regard ing procedural matters, but these l imitations are in  practice 
seldom applicab]e. 
4. ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL'S PROCEDURAL DISCRETION UNDER 
NA l!ONAL ARRITRATION LEGlSLATTON 
Consistent with the New York Conven.tionJ most developed 
national legal systems provide the arbitral tribunal with substantial 
d iscretion to establish the arbitral procedures in tlle absence of 
agreement between the parties, subject only to general due process 
requircrnents. Article 19(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
provides that, where the parties have not agreed upon the arbitrc:�l 
procedures, 1 1  the arbitral tribunal n1ay . . .  conduct the arbitration 
in such l'l manner as il considers appropriate."44 Article 24(1) of the 
Model Law is similar, providing that, ''[s]ubject to any contrary 
agreement by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall decide whether 
to hold an oral hearing for the presentation of evidence or for oral 
argument. . . .  "45 French, Swiss, and other civil law arbitration 
42 Most instihttional arbitration rules expressly provide the arbitral tribunal 
discretion to establish the arbitral procedures (absent agreement between the 
parties). See 2 BORN, supra note 1, at 1758-65 (analyzing the arbitral tribunal's 
procedural discretion under international arbitration conventions). This aulhority 
forms part of the parties' arbitration agreement and is entitled to recognition 
under Article Tt oi the Convention. 
43 See supra note 11 and accomp<mying text. 
44 UNCITRAL, MODEL LAW, st�pm note .:t a1i. 19(2). As discussed below, 
Article 19(2) limits the h·ibunal' s powers by reference to the " provisions of this 
Law," which includes Article 18's requirements that the parties be treated "with 
equality" and be given a "full opportLmity of presenting [their] case(sj." See 2 
BORN, supra note 1, at 1760-62. 
45 UNClTRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art. 24(1). See 2 Born, supra note 1, 
at 1760-62. 
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st21tutes are similar,-Hi as is  contemporary arbitration legislation in 
much of Asiir1:· and La tin /\merica:1x 
In the United Stales, lhe FAA docs not provide any basic 
principles of arbitral procedure or  procedural framework that the 
arbitrators mip;hl consider or that the parties m21y deviC�te from; as 
such, the Act effectively leaves a l l  issues of proced urc entirely lo 
-t "  See, c.;.; . .  1\:der<ll Stntute on Privatt: ln ternationnl L.�nv· Dec. lS, 1%7, RS 291, 
<WL 182(2) (Switz.) ("If 1hl! p;wtit.:s have not determined tll<.: procedure, the Arbitral 
Tribun�1l .:;h,lll dt!lt>r111tnc it to the extent necessan', ei iher d ircctl v or bv reference 
to �, st<�lutl' ��r to rules of .nrbitrJtion."); Decree No. R1-50U of May-1'2, 1981, journal 
Offi..::icl de l<l l�et,ublique Fram;aisc lJ.O.] [Official Gazette of France], p. 1398, 
repri11tcd in N.C.f'.C. cnl!:i. -1-1-9-1-, 1460 (Fr.) ("The arbitrators slwll l<lY down the rules 
for the arbitr,ltion �1roceedin)SS without being bound by lhe rules governing the 
courts of !Oilw, snvl: wht?re the p<�rties have decided otherwise as stipulated in the 
arbitraliOr1 agreement." ) ;  ZivilprozcGordnung [ZPOJ § 1047 (FXG.) ("Subject to 
agreement by the parties, the arbitral tribtm<ll shall decide whethe1· to hold oral 
hearings nr wht·lhcr tlte proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of 
documents c'lnd other materials. Unless the parties h<�ve agreed that no hearings 
shall be held, the arbitral tribunal shall hold such hearings at etn etppropriate stage 
of the proceeding:;;, if so requested by a party"); Zivilprozessordnung fZPO] § 594 
(Austria) ("[llhe pMtiE's arc free to deterrnine the rules of procedure , . . .  F,1iling 
such an agreement, the arbitral tribunal . . .  conduct t1le arbitration in  the manner 
that it considers appropriate."); Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering 
[Netherlands Codl' of Civil Procedure], bk. 4, art. 1036 (Neth.), tmnf:lnted nt 
Netherlands Arbitration Acl Code of Gvil Procedure, http:/ /www.jus.uio.no 
/ lm/netherlands.<1rbitr<:ltion.act.1986/1036.hlm.l (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) 
("Subjecl to the provisions of this Title, the arbitral proceedings shall be 
conducted 1n such manner as agreed between the parties or, to the e, ten.t that the 
parties have not agreed, as determined by the arbitral tribunal."); Houdende het 
gerechtelijk wetboek [Belgian Judicial Code], art. 1693(1). See nlso Oberster 
Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] )an. 25, 1992, 7 Ob 545/92, 1997 Y.B. Comm. 
Arb. 619 (Austria) ("The parties rnay determine tlH� arbitral proceJure i n  the 
arbitmtion agreement or in a separate written agreement. Lacking such 
agreement, the arbitrators decide on the procedure."). 
-�7 See, e.g., Arbitration Law, art. 26(2) (Japan) ("Failing such agreement  
[between the parties], the arbitral tribunal may, subject to  the provisions of  this 
Law, conduct the arbitral proceedings in such manner as it considers 
appropri"ate."); Arbitration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'! 
People's Cong., Oct. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 39 (P.R.C.), translated nt 
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China, http:/ I 
www.lawinfochina.com/lawjdisplay.asp?id=710 (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) ("An 
arbitration tribunal shall hold oral hearings to hear a case. Whereas the parties 
concerned agree not to hold oral hearings, the arbitration tribunal may give the 
awa:rd based on the arbitration application, claims and counter-claims and other 
documents"); [nternational Arbitration P.ct, § 3(1) (Sing.); Hong Kong Arbitration 
Ordinance, No. 341, art. 34C{l ) (1990), available at http:/ /www.hklii.org/hk/legis 
/ord/341. 
·1� See, e.g., C6digo de Comercio [Coo. CoM] (Mexican Commercial Code], art. 
1435(2) (Mex.); international Commercial Arbitration Law, R. No. 1 9.9711 art. 19(2) 
(2004) (Chile). 
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the parties and arbitrators . .J9 Although the FAA does not expressly 
add ress the subject, U .S .  courts have uniformly hel d  tha t 
arbi trators possess broad po wers to determine arbitral procedures 
(absent agreement on such matters by the parties) . so As one U .S.  
court held:  
Unless a mode of conducting the proceedings has  been 
prescribed by the arbitration agreement or submission, or 
regulated by statu te, arbitrators have a general d iscretion as 
to the mode of condu.cting the proceedings and are not 
bound by formal ru les of  procedure and evidence, and the 
standard of review of arbi tration procedures is rTterely 
whether a party to an arb i tration has been denied a 
fundamental ly fair hearing.s 1 
49 The Revised Uni form Arbitration Act makes this explicit. 
An arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in such manner as the 
arbitrator considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of 
the proceeding. The authority conferred upon the arbitrator includes the 
power to hold conferences vvith the parties to the arbitration proceed ing 
before the hearing and, among other matters, determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence. 
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 15 (a), 7 U.L.A. 2 (2000) . 
so Berhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S.  1 98, 203 (1956); D.E . I . ,  Inc. v .  
Ohio and Vicinity Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 155 Fed. App'x 1 64, 1 70 (6th Cir. 
2005) ("Arbitrators are not bound by formal rules of procedure and evidence, and 
the standard for judicial review of arbitration procedures is merely whether a 
party to arbitration has been denied a fundamentally fair hearing." )  (quoting Nat' I 
Post Office Mailhandlers v .  U.S. Postal Service, 751 F.2d 834, 841 (6th Cir. 1 985)); 
Int' l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v .  Marrowbone Dev. Co., 232 F.3d 383, 
389 (4th Cir. 2000) ("An arbitrator typically retains broad discretion over 
procedural matters . . . .  ") ;  Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe 
Generale de L' Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974) ("By agreeing 
to submit disputes to arbitration, a party relinquishes his courtroom rights ­
including that to subpoena witnesses - in favor of arbitration 'with all  of its well 
known advantages and drawbacks."') (quoting Washington-Baltimore 
Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. The Washington Post, Co. 442 F .2d 1234, 1238 
(1971)); Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F .  
Supp. 1063, 1067 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (" [A]rbitrators are charged with the duty of 
determining what evidence is relevant and what is irrelevant, and that barring a 
clear showing of abuse of discretion, the court will not vacate an award based on 
improper evidence or the lack of proper evidence."); In re Arbitration Between 
United States Turnkey Exploration, Inc. and PSI, Inc. (In re Turnkey Arbitration), 
577 So.2d 1131, 1 135 (La. Ct. App. 1991) . 
5 1  In re Turnkey Arbitration, 577 So. 2d 1 131, 1 135 (1991 ) .  
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Particularly following the 1996 Arbitration Act, English !a  w i� 
to the scune effect/:! as arc other common law jurisdktions. ;_1 
:> .  MANDATORY PROCEDuRAL REQUIREJ\IE[\;TS IN 1Nl£1<N.;\ TION.L\L 
A RBI rRATlON 
The pm·ties' freedom to �gree upon the arbitral procedures, and 
lhe t1·ibunal's discretion to adopt such procedures (absent contrary 
agreen1ent), are subject to the mandatory requirements of 
clpplicable national C:md international iaw. As discussed below, in 
most cases, particulmly i11 developed l egc1l r·egimes, appEcBble 
n1anda tory law imposes only very general, albeit irnport.:mt, 
guarantees of procedural fairness C"md regulclrily. 
5. 1 .  NlmJr!otury Procedural Protections under Jutcmationa! 
Arbilrnlion Co11Ve11tio1LS 
All leading international arbitration conventions indirectly 
recognize and give effect to mandatory requirements of procedural 
fairness and regularity of the arbitral proceedings. They do so by 
permitting arbitral uwards to be denied recognition i f  basic 
requirements of procedural fairness have not been salisfied, while 
leaving room for non-discrin1inatory, non-idiosyncn1tic rules of 
52 Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 34(1) (Eng.) (" [l shall be for the tribunal to 
decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject to the right of the parties to 
agree any matter.''); ABB Attorney General v. Hochtief Airport GmbH, [2006] 
EWIIC 388, ,1 67 (Comm.) (Eng.) ("It is not a ground for intervention that the 
court considers that it might have done things differently ."); Pet.roships Pte Ltd of 
Singapore v, Petec Trading & lnv. Corp. of Vietnam (The Petro Ranger) [2001] 2 
EWHC 4181 419 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (award may be annulled under § 68(2)(a) only 
"where it can be said that what hCls happened is so far removed from what can 
reasonably be expected of the arbitral process, that the Court will take action"). 
53 See, e.g., Commercial Arbitrati.on Act, R.S.C., c. 17, § 19(2) (1985) (Can.) 
(''Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may , subject to the provisions of 
this Code, conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. The 
power conferred upon the arbitr(-11 tribunal includes the power to determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence."); International 
Arbitration Act, 1974, c. V, art. 19(2) (Austl.) ("Failing such agreement, the arbitral 
tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this Law, conduct the arbih·ation in such 
manner as it considers appropriate. The pow12r conferred upon the arbitral 
tribunal includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality 
and weight of any evidence."); Arbitration Act, 1996 S.R. No. 99, § 19(2) (N.Z.) 
("Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribt.U1al may, subject to the provisions of 
this Schedule, conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. 
The power conJerred u pon the arl>itral lTibumd includes the power to dt:?termine 
tbe ndn1issibilitv, relevance, materialitv, and weight of any evidence.") , 
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mandatory national law aimed at ensuring procedural fairness and 
equal i ty to operate. 
Article V(l) (b) of the New York Convention is representative, 
permi tting non-recognition of an award where " [ t ]he party against 
whom the avvard is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or 
was otherwise u n nble to present lzis case . " 54 Artic le  V (2) (b) of the 
Convention is also potentially applicable in cases of serious 
procedural u nfai rness, permitting non-recognition of arbitral 
a ward s for violati ons of l ocal public policy, inclu ding procedural 
public policies.ss The European and I nter-American Conventions 
feature similar provisions.56 The applica tion of manda tory 
standards of procedural fairness under these various international 
instruments has been termed '' international procedural public 
policy" by some commentators.57 
Articles V (l ) (b) and V(2) (b) of the New York Convention and 
parallel provisions of other conventions have been interpre ted to 
afford the p arties and arbitral tribunal substantial  freedom to 
establish the arbitral procedures.58 Nonetheless, these provisions 
permit national courts to deny recognition to arbitral awards that 
are based upon fundamentally unfair, arbitrary, or unbalanced 
procedures, applying either a uniform international s tandard of 
procedural fairness under Article V (l) (b) or local procedural public 
policies and procedural p rotections guaranteed by mandatory 
national law under Article V(2) (b) .59 Both of these provisions 
provide limited grounds on which either the parties' procedural 
54  New York Convention, supra note 4, art. V (1 ) (b) (emphasis added). 
55 Id.  art. V(2) (b) . 
56 European Convention, supra note 1 7, art. IX(1) (b); Inter-American 
Convention, supra note 18, arts . 5 (1 ) (b), 5 (2) (b) . 
57 See Franz Schwarz & Helmut Ortner, Procedu ral Ordre P u blic and the 
In ternationalization of Public Policy in A rbitration in AUSTRIAN ARBITRATION Y.B .  1 33 
(Christian Klausegger et al . eds., Stampfli 2007); Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, 
Towards A Transna tional Procedu ral P ublic Policy, in TOWARDS A UNIFORM 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? 1 68, 168 (Anne Veronique Schlaepfer et al .  eds., 
Juris Publishing 2005) (describing how a great majority of nations has agreed to 
the same principles of international arbitration procedure, thereby creating a 
transnational procedural public policy); Stephen M.  Schwebel & Susan G .  Lahne, 
Public Polin; and A rbitral Procedu re, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC 
PoLICY IN ARBITRATION 206 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1987) (discussing the uniform 
transnational principles within public policy that shape arbitral procedure). 
ss See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
59 See 2 Born, supm note 1, at 2740-46 (outlining possible sources of standards 
for procedural fairness under the New York Convention) . 
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agreemen ts, o r  a n  arbitral tri bunal's proced ural orders (absent 
agreement of the parties),  can be overri dden by na tional law for 
purposes of recogni tion proceedings.  
The procedural standards applicable under Article V ( l ) (b) are 
not national, but  instead in1pose a u nifon11 international standard 
regarding p rocedural o pportunities to be heard . r)o This public 
pol icy applies uniformly in all Contracting States and does not 
permit individ ual states to deny recognition to awards based on 
local laws or  public pol icy.61 These i nternational sta ndards of 
procedural fairness are related to, and i nformed by, sta ndards of 
fair and equitable  treatment that have developed in the context of 
international investment law.62 
The procedural public policy applicab le  under Article V(2) (b) is  
different in character from the standards appl icable under Article 
V (l ) (b); Article V (2) (b) establishes an excep tional escape device 
based on l ocal public policy rather than uniform international 
standards, w hich does not affect the validity or enforceabil i ty of 
the award in  other states. 63 Thus, Article V (2) (b) permi ts a 
Contracting State to rely on  its own national public policies to deny 
recognition to an award, just as it may invoke i ts own local 
procedural public policies to annu l  an international arbitral award 
made local ly .  
There have been suggestions that, for  purposes both of non­
recognition of a n  award under Article V (2) (b) and annulment of an 
award made locally, the relevant procedural public policy i n  
international cases must, under the Convention, b e  international . 64 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id.; Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.P.A (ELSI) (U.S. v.  Italy), 1989 
I .C.J. 1 5, 76 (July 20) (contrasting procedural fairness required by international law 
with arbitrariness and noting that " [a]rbitrariness is not so much something 
opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to the rule of law. This idea was 
expressed by the Court in the Asylum case, when it spoke of ' arbi trary action' 
being 'substituted for the rule of law.'  It is a wilful [sic] disregard of due process 
of Jaw . . . .  " (citations omitted)); Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment: Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.­
[Country] art. 5 (2) (a), Nov. 2004, http :/  jwww.ustr.gov/ assets/Trade_Sectors 
/ Investment/Model_BIT / asset_upload_£ile847 _6897.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model 
BIT] ('"fair and equitable treatment includes the obligation not to deny justice in 
criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the 
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world" ) .  
63 See 2 BoRN, supra note 1, a t  2827-33, 2841-2851 .  
6-1 See, e.g., Schwebel & Lahne, supra note 57, at 209 (" increasingly recognizing 
that narrow, national istic grounds of public policy that might be properly 
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That position tcsls on the desirabi] j ty of applying uniform, neLttral 
inten1c1tion.:1 l standitrds, particularly as to proced ural rnattcrs of 
which basic concepts of fairness and equc:llity are broadly sin1ilar in 
most states. 
This argument is u I t imately impossible to accept, however, a t  
least a s  a malLcr L)f interpreting the Convention's requirements. As 
discussed iu_ti'a, il is relc1tively clear that both Article V(2)(b) and the 
Convention's tretttmcnt of ann u l ment contcmplat·e lhc possibility 
of tbe a�1plication l)f local and nC� tional public policics.h"' Requiring 
the application ot uniforrn international procedural public pol icies 
would contr<ldict the rule reserved for the local public policies and 
mandatory IC'nvc; of Contracting States under Lhe Convention. 
Despite this, there is a substantial argument that Article I l  of the 
New York Comrention and parallel provJStons of other 
international arbitration conventions should not be in terpreted as 
leaving Conlracling States entirely free to impose local procedures 
on local ly-seated inlernational arbitrations. 
Rather, the Convention is best interpreted as prescribing 
internt:�tional l i mits on the procedural requirem.en t s  that 
Contracting States may apply to international arbitral proceedings, 
either in a recognition proceeding under Article V(2)(b) or in an 
am1ulment or other proceeding in the arbitral seat. Specifically, the 
Convention should be interpreted as requiring that local 
procedural requirements be exceptions to the general principle of 
party au tonomy that are tailored to safeguarding t h e  equality of 
the parties and their opportunities to be heard, and as precl uding 
Contracting States from imposing discriminatory or i diosyncratic 
local proced ural rules on international arbitrations.6o Under this 
interpretation, a Contracting State could not deny any role for the 
parties' procedural a u tonon'ly .in international arbitrations, and 
domestic procedural rules would apply regardless of what the 
applicable in domestic cases are inappropriate In international cases") (quoting 
Howard Holtzman, ConllltCJLlllrtf, ill INTERNATJONAL ARBITRATION, 60 YEARS ON: A 
LOOK AT THE FUTURE 361, 364 (1984)); see also Pierre Mayer & Audley Sheppard, 
FiJLa! IL!i Reporl un Public Policy rrs a Bar to Enforcement of lnternationnl Arbitral 
Awards, 19 ARB. IN"r'L 249, 251 n.10 (2003) (noting that most national legislation 
indudes pLtblk policy exceptions, although some refers to internationa l public 
policy) . 
65 See Yfantili<1-Serrano, stlpm note 57, at 1 89-90 (noting difficulties in 
applying transnational procedma l public policy); 2 BORN, supra note 1, <.1t 2554-60, 
2830-38. 
N> Sec 1 BOR;.J, �upm note l, at 1 258-70; 2 BOI\N, s11prn note 1, at 2.556-60, 2.620-
23, 2627-46, �728-�0. 
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parties agreed. Thus, a Contracting State ought not be clble to deny 
effect to Z�ny p rocedural agreem.ent between lhe paTties ( for 
example, by imposing local l i t igation procedures on every 
arbitration conducted locally, regardless of the parties' <:1greement) 
to deny effect to any chojce by the parties of Cl fore ign arbitral 
institution's arbitration nlles (for example, by denying effect to 
agreem.ents selecting the UNCITRI-\L, ICC, or CfET AC Ru lcs), or to 
deny effect to lhe parties' choice of a foreign arbitral se21t (for 
example, by requiring that all cubitrations be cm1d ucted locolly). 
These results violate the basic premise of pilrty a u tonomy 
underlying A rticles 11(3) e1 nd V(l )(d), as well as Lbe Convention's 
objeclives of facil itati ng the enforcem�nt of agreements to arbitrate 
and the international arbitral process. Equally, in recognition 
actions, these resu l ts would convert the role of local pub I ic policy 
under Article V(2)(b) from providing an exceptional escape device 
to mandating affirmatively a con1prehensive procedural code; 
again, that is contrary to the Convenlion's structure and treatment 
of the public policy exception generally. Rather, in both 
annulment actions and in recognition actions opplying Article 
V(2)(b), the Convention should be interpreted as permitting 
Contracting States to apply, as an exceptional escape device, only 
non-discriminatory local procedural protections that are consistent 
with state practice under the Convention. This interpretation of 
the Convention, which mandates structural l imitations on 
Contracting States' reliance on local public policies, parallels the 
similar li1nitations Articles II and V in1pose on the pern1issible 
grounds for a Contracting State to deny effect to the validity of a n  
international arbitration agreement o r  to annul a n  international 
arbitral award.67 
Finally, even if the Convention were interpreted as allowing 
Contracting States complete freedom to in1pose rnandatory 
procedural requirements on international arbitrations that are 
seated locally, i t  is clear that other Contracting States are free to 
recognize arbitral awards that are annu. l1ed on the basis of 
idiosyncratic or discriminatory local procedural requirements. 
That is contemplated expressly by Article V(l)(d), which gives 
priority to the parties' procedural autonomy, and by Article VII, 
which leaves Contracting States free to recognize awards on more 
r7 hi. at 2556-60, 2838-40. 
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hberal grounds than those under Article \l.bs Indeed, other 
Contracting Ste1tes nre in principle required, by virtue of Articles 
U(3) and V(1) (b), to recognize arbih·al awards that have been 
annulled i n  the arbitral seat on the basis of national laws that 
prescribe mandatory discriminatory or id iosyncratic procedural 
requirements.�'�'' 
5.2. Mnutintory Proccdurnl Protections uuder Nntionol A rbitration 
Legis/a I it111 
Consistent vvith the New York Convention, most developed 
legal systems do not impose significant mandatory l imitations on 
the freedom of the parties or the arbitral tribunal to conduct the 
arbitration. Rather, parties are free to agree to arbitral procedures 
that suit their interests witl.1in very deferential mandatory limHs 
and arbitrators are empowered to prescribe arbitTal procedures 
when the parties have made no agreement on the subject.?O 
Nevertheless, legislation and/ or judicial decisions in  most 
developed jwisdictions require that arbitral proceed ings seated on 
local territory satisfy minin1al standards of procedural fairness and 
equality. These star1dards are variously referred to as requiring 
"due process," "natural justice," "procecl ural regu larity" or " fa ir 
and equitable treatm_ent."71 
The UNCTTRAL Model Law is i l lustrative of this basic, 
mandatory requirement of procedural fairness. Article 18 of the 
Model Law requires that " [t]he parties shall be trented with equality 
and each party slznll be given n fu/1 opportunity of presenting his case" .n 
6S See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; see- nlso 2 BORN, supm note 1 ,  
at 2764-74. 
69 See suprn notes 14-16 a,nd accompanying text; �ec also 2 BORN, s11pm note 1, 
at 2689-99. 
70 Sec supra notes 11-36 and accompanying text. 
71 As discussed above, most national arbitration legislation imposes 
mandatory procedural requirements on arbitrations with their seat on local 
territory. See UNCTTRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, supra note 9, 
,111; UN CITRA L, MODEL LAW arts. 1 (2), 18; Federal Statute on Private 
International Law, RS 291 arts. 176(1), 1 82(3) (Switz.); Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, 
§§ 2(1 ), 33 (Eng.); Arbitration Law, Law No. 138 of 2003, arts. 3(1), 25 (Japan). 
n UNOTRAL, MODEL LAW art. 18 (emphasis added). Sec HowARD M. 
H.OLTZMf\f\JN & JOS"PH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE l.JNOTRAL MODEL LAW ON 
INTERNATIONAL (OMMERCif\L ARBITRATTON: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND (O:VIMENTARY 
550 (1989) ("Article 18 l"'Stablishes the fundamental principlc.>s thnt in all 
arbitrations under Lhe Law each party must be tre,1ted with equality anJ be given 
a full opportunity tct pr�sent i1.is c-ase.''). 
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The Model Law also mCikes clear that this is a manda tory provision 
for locally-seated arbitrations, which overrides contrary agreement 
by the parties or actions by a tribunaJ.73 Similarly, Article 182(3) of 
the Swiss Lavv on Private l nternationcll Law provides, again in 
mandatory terms, that, " [ r  ]egardless of the procedure chosen [by 
the parties and/or tribunal], the Arbitral tribunal shcdl ensure 
equal treatn1ent of the parties and the right of both parties to be 
heard in an ad  vcrsc-wicll proceeding."7-t Other developed nationa I 
arbitration regimes are simil.ar in their approaches lo mt1ndatory 
procedural protections in arbitrations with their seats on local 
terri torv. T5 
In the United States, lhe FAA has been interpreted as imposing 
similar mandatory requirements of bCisic procedllral fairness, 
emphasizing equa l ity of treatment, an adequate opportunity to be 
heard, and procedural regularity _76 J Lldicial decisions in other 
leadjng jurisdictions are broadly sin1ilar,n as are arbitral awards7R 
and institu tiona[ rules.'9 
73 UNCITRAL, MODEL LAW art. 19(1). The same guarcmlees ure also 
contained in the (related) provisions of national law regard·ing the annuln1ent 
and/ or t·ecognition of arbitral awards. Thus, Articles 34(2)(a)(ii) and 36(1 )(a)(ii) of  
the Model Law provide for annulment or non-recognition of an aw<1rd if "the 
party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
.::1ppointmenl of a n  arbitrator or was otherwise unable to present his case," 
UNCTTRAL, MODEL LAW arts. 34(2)(a)(ii), 36(1)(a)(ii). See 2 BORN, �upm note 1, a t -
2573-95, 2736-46. 
7·1 Federal Statute on Private International Law, RS 291 art. 182(3) (Switz.). 
See Schneider, supm note 22, 184; BERNHARD BERGER & FRANZ KELLERHALS, 
INTERNATrONALE UNO INTERNE SCHlEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER SCHWEIZ � 1003 
(2006). 
75 Sec, e.g., ZiviJprozefSordnung [ZPO] § 1042(1) (P.R.G.); judici<d Code, arts. 
1693{1), 1694 (Belg.); Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure], bk. 4, arts. ]036, 
1039(1)-(2) (Neth.); Decree No. 81-500 of May 12, 1981, journal OJ.ficiel de Ia 
Republique Fran<;aise U.O.] [Official Gazette of France), p. 1398, reprinted in 
N.C.P.C. arts. 1502(4), 1502(5) (Fr.); Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 33(1) (Eng.); 
International Arbitration Act, 2002, ch. 143A, §§ 3(1), 15A(l) (Sing.); UNOTRAL, 
MODEL LAW art. 18; japanese Arbitration Law, supra note 28, art. 25 (''(1) The 
parties shall be Lreated with equality in the arbitral proceedings. (2) Each party 
shall be given a full opportunity of presenting its case in the arbitral 
proceedings."). 
76 Section 10 of the FAA contains the grotmds for vacating an arbitral award 
subject to the domestic FAA. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 0  (2006). As 
discussed infrn, section 10(3) permits annulment if "the arbitrators were guilty of 
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or 
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of e1ny 
other misbehavior by which the righls of any party have been prejudiced." 
7i See, e.g., MORS v. Su per01arket Sys., Cour d' appel [ CA] [regic•na I court of 
appt!al] Paris, Apr. 18 1991, 1995 Rev. arb. 448; Imrnoplan v. tv·fercure, Com 
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Every j u risdiction has i ts  own particular national standard of 
" d ue p rocess" or " na tural justice" tha t must  be applied to 
arbitrations with their seats w ithin local terr itory . Both in verbal 
formulation and specific application, these standards d i ffer from 
s ta te to state .  
For the most part, however, t here are only l imited differences 
among the national s tandards of due process tha t are applied to 
the interna ti onal arbi tral process in  developed jurisdictions . That 
is in  part because of the very deferential approach that is  taken in 
most developed legal systems to the par ties' procedural  autonomy 
in  international arbitra tions . I t  is also in  part because of the steps 
to·wards " convergence" that have occurred with regard to  l i t iga tion 
procedures in d eveloped j urisdictions over the past decade.so 
Thus, i n  most leading j urisdictions, mandatory national l aw 
imposes only very limi ted restric tions on the parties' a u tonomy to 
agree upon arbitral procedures. In general, only a greement to 
egregiously unfair, u nconscionable or w h o l ly arbitrary proce dures 
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Jan. 19, 1990, 1 991 Rev. arb. 1 25; 
Gbangbola v_ Sm.ith & Sheriff Ltd, (1998) 3 All E.R. 730, 731 (Q.B.)  (discussing 
overturning a rbitral awards based on "serious irregularity");  Bundesgericht 
[BGer] [Federal Court] Dec 30, 1 994, 13 ASA Bu l l .  217, 221 (1995) (Switz.); 
Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] September 24, 1 981,  7 Ob 623/81,  
1982 OJZ 77 (Austria); Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] (Supreme Court] September 6, 
1990, 6 Ob 572/90, 1991 RdW 327 (Austria) .  
7 8  See, e.g., Aryeh v. Iran, 33 Iran-U.S. Cl .  Trib. Rep. 272, 287-88 (1997) 
(" (B]oth parties to the case are entitled to have an equal opportunity to present 
written submissions and to respond to each other's submissions. This also means 
that the parties must have an equal opportunity to go through the evidence and 
the arguments submitted by the other party, and to prepare their own position 
and arguments in advance of the hearing." ); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 
Decision on Crown Privilege and Solicitor-Client Privilege (Sept. 6, 2000), � 1 . 5  (" it 
is an overriding principle (Article 1 5) that the parties be h·eated with equality") ,  
available at  http:/ / www .naftaclaims.com/ Disputes/ Canada/ Pope 
/ PopeAwardOnCrownPri vilegeSolicitorClientPrivilege. pdf. 
79 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. See also UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, G.A Res . 31/98, Art. 1 (2), U .N .  Doc. A/RES/35/52 (Dec. 1 5, 1 976) ("These 
Rules shall govern the arbitration except that where any of the Rules is in conflict 
with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties 
cannot derogate, that provision shal l  prevail") .  
s o  See, e.g., Int'l Bar Assoc. [ IBA],  IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in Int 'l 
Commercial Arbitration, (June 1 ,  1999) available a t  http:/ / int-bar.org 
/ images/ downloads/ IBA % 20rules %20on %20the%20taking%20of% 20Evidence 
.pdf (setting out the principles for the taking of evidnce in international 
commercia l  arbitration); ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATiONAL CIVIL 
PROCEDURE (200-±) (setting out rules for the evidence phase of international 
arbitration proceedings); 2 BORN, supra note t at 1789-92. 
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will be held unenforceable. As one U.S. decision, vvhich cldOpled e1 
particularly robust vicvv of the parties' autonon1y, put it :  
Short 0f a uthorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more 
doubtfully, by a pC1nel of three monkeys, parties can 
stipulate to wh<'ltever procedures they want to govern the 
arbitration of their disputes; parties are as free to specify 
idiosyncratic terms of arbitration as they are to specify any 
other terms in their contract.�'t 
Somewhat less expansively (and less colorfully), the 1996 
English Arbilration Act declares: '1 the parties should be free to 
<lgree how their disputes are resolved, subject only Lo such 
safeguards as are necessary in the public interest.��s� 
This provision is correctly described as giving effect to the 
principle of "party Rutonomy, that is to say that the parties should 
be free to agree how their disputes are resolved subject only to 
such safeguards as are necessary in the public i nterest."::>:" A 
decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal reflected the san1e deference 
to the parties' procedural autonomy and the arbitrators' discretion: 
It should be underlined that procedm:al public policy will 
constitute only a si.rnple exclusion provision, namely that it  
wil 1 1nerely have a protective function and wil l  not generate 
any positive rules. This is because the legisla ture did not 
desire that procedural public policy should be extensively 
interpreted and that there should arise a code of arbitral 
procedure to which the p rocedure, as freely selected by the 
parties should be subjected.84 
81 Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coacl1 Emp. o£ Am., AF.L. v. Conn., 
112 A2d 501, 503 (Conn. 1955) ("If fan arbih·ation agreementj specifies methods of 
procedure £or the arbitration, the arbih·ators will be bound to that procedure 
unless i t  is in violation of lav,, or public poliE:y."); BERGER & KELLERHALS, supra note 
741 � 1018 (noting that parties ccumot in general waive right to fair hearing and 
equal treatment, but can waive the minimum requirement of due process in 
circwnscribed circumstances or after individual circumstances occur). 
s2 Arbitration Act, 1996 c. 23, § l(b) (Eng.). 
83 Alban v. Naza Motor Trading Sdn Bhd [2007] EWHC 1879, �'11 (Ch) (U.K.). 
See also MERKIN, Sltprn note 23, �10.50 ("The 1996 Act is specific in its intention to 
signpost a move away from arbitrations which resemble court proceedings"). 
!54 Bundesgericht [BGerl [Federal C()urt) Dec 30, 1994, 13 J\ssn. Switz. Arb. 
Bull. 2.17, 221 (Switz.). 
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That is, the procedun1l protections that manda tory law or 
public policy impose do not include some general procedu rc:1l code 
or regime (''\rvil.l not generate any positive rules"), but are i nstet'ld 
spcci fie, tailo:·ed protections (" a  simple exclusion provision") 
ain.1ed al preventing a fundamental! y unfair procedure from being 
agreed to by the parties or jmposed by the arbitral tribunal. 
There is .; m  in1portnnt distinction between the application of 
mandatory len'\/ l imi ts to the parties' proced ural agreements and 
the applica tion of mandatory law limits to the arbitra 1 tribunal's 
procedural directions. Although il is of course possible for parties' 
procedural agreements to be unconscionably one-sided or unfair, 
natiorwl courts are very reluctant to reach such a conclusion in 
cases involving commercial parties.ss National courts are 
deferential, bLLt less so, lo procedural d irections made by arbitrc-d  
tribunals in  the absence of the parties' consent to those d irections.s11 
This distinction is appropriate. Although the parties' 
arbitration agreement wil l  ordinarily grant the arbitrators broad 
procedural discretion, this is not intended to be, and cam1ot be 
regarded as, unlimited. A tribunal ' s imposition of unfair or 
arbitrary procedures, over a party's objection, is very di fferent 
from a party's knowing and informed acceptance of such 
procedures, etther for reasons of its own or i n  return for other 
benefits .57 
ss See, e.g., id.; 8nmvati, 28 F.3d a t  709 (recognizing parties' broad authority to 
adopt procedural m.easures of their d10ice); Amalgamated Ass'!l of St. Elec. Ry. & 
Motor Conclt E111ployees of A111erica, 112 A.2d a t  SOl ("If [an arbitration agreementj 
specifies methods of procedure for the ar·bitration, the arbitrators will be bound to 
that procedure unless it is in violation of law or public policy."); BERGER suprn note 
49, § 1018 (noting that parties cannot in general w2ive right to fair hearing and 
equal treahnent, but can waive the minimum requirement of due process in 
circumscribed circumstances or after individual circumstances occur). 
S6 See, e.g., Gallagher v. Schernecker, 208 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Wis. 1973) 
(" Arbih·ators have a good deal of discretion in cutting off repetitious or 
clllnulative testimony but they have gone. beyond the limit of discretion when 
they refuse to hear evidence pertinent and material to this djspute."); Paklito 
Investment Ltd. v. Kleckner East Asia Ltd., 2 H.K.L.R. 39 (HC 1993) (I-LK.) 
(denying enforcement of award because defendant was not given the opportunity 
to comment on the report produced by the expert appointed by the tribunal); 
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON lNTERNATlONI\L COMMERCIAL ARB!TRATTON § 
1698 (E. Gaillnrd & ]. Savage eds., 1999); MERKlN, supra note 23, � �  14.10, 14.12. 
See nls0 infm notes 107-108 and accompanying text. 
R7 The same distinction is drawn in the annulment and recognition contexts. 
See infrn notes 103-105 and accompanying text. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/22
200<-J) JUDICIAL NON-lNT[RFERENCE PI�INClPLE 1 025 
/\[though mc-mdG�tory naliondl pro(edural gLtarcm tees are in 
prjnciplc applicable lo arbitrations seated in local territory, the 
application of nat ionCil 1CI  w to override the parties' agreement on 
arbitral procedures cnn violate guarantees for party a utonomy in 
leading international conventions. As discussed above, only 
viola tions of non-discrin1inatory, non-idiosyncratic pnKedurcd 
norms tailored to safeguard the fairness of the arbitral process 
sho u l d  be grotmds for refusals to give effect lo agreements on 
arbi tr,i l  procedu res.�:- Fi nally, as d iscussed below, violations of 
mandatory procedural requirements should be redressable only a t  
the end o f  the arbitral process through non-recognition o f  the 
arbitral award - in annulment or recognition proceedings - not by 
i nterlocutory judicia I intervention i n  the ongoing arbitra I process.ll'� 
6 .  PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL NON-INTERFERENCE I N  l'JTER. "AT10Ni\L 
ARBITRA-I LO . .  
There is Cl further principle which complements the foregoing 
principles of international arbitral procedure. Leading 
international arbitration conventions and national arbitration 
statu Les recognize the principle of judicial non-interference i n  
arbitral proceedings, albeit usually indirectly. The New York 
Convention reflects an indirect treatment of the issue, while other 
instruments are more explicit and d i rect.QO 
This principle of judici3l non-interference in international 
arbitral proceedings is no less - and arguably more - important 
than the foregoing r u les of procedural autonon1y, arbitrator 
discretion and procedural fairness. Nonetheless, the prin.ciple of 
judicial non-interference has received substantially less a t tention. 
Indeed, many works on international arbitration either entirely 
ignore the principle or give i t  n o  more than passing attention. 
gs Sec s11pra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. Tn annulment actions, the 
courts of the arbilTal seat wottld be afforded greater scope to apply local 
mandatory rules and public policies CIS escape devices than in recognition actions, 
but international limits should nonetheless apply. ld. See nlso injrn notes 97-102 
c�nd accompanying text. 
59 See infra notes 93-97 and accompanyi.n.g text. 
90 As discussed above, the Geneva Convention and the Geneva Protocol 
confirm the parties' autonomy to agree upon arbitral procedures (as do the New 
York, Europecm 8nd Inter-American Conventions). See supra notes 12-15 and 
accompanying text. This nlle mily suggest, but does not necessarily require, <1 
principle of judicial non-interferen(E'. 
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6 . 1 .  Principle of judicial Non-1n teljcrence Under the NezD York 
Co! zven tio 1 1  
Nothing in  the New York Convention expressly provides that 
national courts shal l  not entertain interlocutory procedural 
applications concerning the ongoing conduct of in ternational 
arbi trations (e.g., to dispute a tribunal's procedural t in1etable, 
disclosure orders, or evidentiary rulings) . Nonetheless, Article 
I I (3) of the Convention provides that national courts shal l  "refer 
the parties to arbi trab on" after ascertaining th e existence of a valid 
arbitration agreement w i thou t making provision for any fu rther 
judicia l ro l e  in the arbitration proceed ings.91 At the same time that 
nei ther A rticle Il (3) nor any oth er part of the Conven tion pro vides 
for judicial involvement in establishing, moni toring or overseeing 
the procedures used in the arbitration, Article V of the Convention 
defines the role of national courts w ith exclusive reference to 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards .92 
As discussed above, Article II(3) is  a m andatory provision, 
requiring that  national courts either dismiss or stay c laims that are 
subject to a valid arbi tration agreement and refer the parties to 
arbitration.<J3 The only exception to this principle involves 
interlocutory judicial decisions on jurisdictional challenges to the 
arbitration agreemenV4 which are contemplated by Article II of the 
Convention.95 The effect of this requirement - particularly as 
interpreted in l ight of the Convention's purposes ( i .e . ,  to prescribe 
uniform international rules that facilitate the arbitral process) and 
structure ( i . e ., only providing for review of awards in Article V)96 -
is  to forbid the courts of Contracting States from supervising or 
9t New York Convention, supra note 1 2, art. I I (3) . See 1 BORN, supra note 1 ,  at 
1014-20, 1024-31; ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, Enforcement of the Arbitra tion 
Agreelllent, in THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1 958 1 31 ,  1 37 (Kluwer 
Law and Taxation 1981) ("it  is a fundamental principle of arbitration, and 
especially international commercial arbitration, that an arbitrator adjudicates the 
entire case and that a national court does not interfere with his decision-making 
powers"; Article Il(3) can therefore be said to have the effect of a partial 
incompetence of the court) . 
92 See 2 BoRN, supra note 1, at 2702-78. 
93 Jd. 
94 Id. 
95 The only other exceptions involve judicial assistance in constituting the 
arbitral tribunal, provisional relief in aid of arbitration and judicial assistance in 
the taking of evidence - all of which are supportive of the arbitral process and 
either conten1plated by or consistent with the Convention. Id. 
96 Id. 
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second-guessing the ongoing procedural conduct of arbitrations.  
Absent contrary agreement by the parties, Artic le I I (3) req uires that 
national courts simply " refer the parties to arbitration," vvith any 
subsequent judicia l  involvement l imited to annulment or 
recognition proceedings, and does not permit them to make or 
supervise procedural decisions in the course of an ongoing 
arbitration 97 
Thi s is a fundamentally important consequence of the 
Convention tha t is not always app reciated . Article I l (3) does not 
leave the principle  of judicial non-interference in internationa l 
arbitrations to national l egislation. Rather, Article I I (3) i mposes 
this obl igation directly on Contracting States, for b i d ding their  
courts from doing anything other than referring the parties to a 
valid arbitration agreement or to arbitration pending an award. 
6 . 2 .  P rin ciple of Ju dicial Non -In te1jeren ce Under the In ter-A merican 
Conven tion 
The Inter-American Convention is even more specific in 
adopting a principle of judicial non-interference in the arbitral 
process than the New York Convention. As noted above, Article 3 
of the Convention incorporates the IACAC Rules, including Article 
15(1 )  thereof, which grants the tribunal authority " to conduct the 
arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate . " 9S These 
provisions, coupled w ith the absence of any provisions for general 
judicial supervision of ongoing arbitral proceedings, leave no room 
for interlocutory judici a l  intervention in the procedural conduct of 
the arbitration. 
6 .3 .  Principle of Judicial Non-In te1jerence Under the Eu ropean 
Conven tion 
The European Convention also affirms the princ iple of judicial 
non-interference in the arbitral  proceeding. Article IV(1)  provides 
97 See also Matthieu de Boisseson, A n ti-Suit  Inju nctions Issued by National 
Cou rts: At the Seat of the A rbitration or Elsewhere, in A NTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 65, 68 (E. Gaillard ed., 2005) (citing the Arbitral 
Tribunal's enforcement of the arbitration agreements with l imited to no deference 
to local courts in a 2001 decision); Jose Carlos Fernandez Rozas, A n ti-Suit  
Inju nctions Issued by National Cou rts: Measu res Addressed to the Parties or  to the 
A rbi trators, in ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS IN INTEI<NATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra, at 73, 
81 .  
98  Inter-American Convention, supra note 19,  art .  3; l0JTER-AM. COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION COM:'v!' N  R.,  supra note 39, art . 15(1 ) .  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
1 028 U.  Pa. f. l i z t 'l L .  [Vol. 30:4 
that parties " shall  be free to submit their disputes" to arbi tration, 
and " to lay do-vvn the procedure to be foll ovved by the 
arbitrators . " 99 Like the New York and Tnter-An1erican 
Conventions, nothing in the European Convention provides for 
judicial supervision of arbitral proced ures; instead, it contemplates 
only na tional court i nvolvement in relation to jurisdictional 
decisions,1oo interim reliettcn and review of awards . 1 02 This leaves 
no room for national courts to supervise or regulate the arbitrators' 
procedural decisions . 
6 .4. Principle of fudicial  Nm z- [rz teJferen ce u nder Na tiol lal  Arbitra tion 
Legisla tion 
Arbitration statutes and judicial decisions in most developed 
ju risdictions are even more emphatic than interna tional arbitration 
conventions regarding the principle of judicial non-interference. 
Article 5 of the UNCITRAL  Model La w provides " [i ] n  n'la tters 
governed by this Law, no cou rt shall in tervene excep t  where so 
provided in this Lmu . " 1 03 The Model Law then sets forth l imi ted 
circumstances involving judicial support for the arbitral process 
(e.g.,  resolving jurisdictional objections, assisting in  constitution of 
the tribunaL granting provisional relief, considering applications to 
vacate awardsV04 but d oes not permit judicial supervision of 
procedural decisions through interlocutory appeals or otherwise.1os 
In  the words of one court asked to review interim d ecisions by a 
tribunal: 
I t  is premature, in effect, at this stage of proceedings, to ask 
the Superior Court of Quebec to intervene on questions that 
9 9  European Convention, supra note 17, art .  IV(a) (b) (iii ) .  
100 Id. arts. VI(1 )-(3) .  
1o1 Jd. art. VI(4) .  
1 02 Jd. art. IX. 
103 UNCITRAL, MODEL LAvV, supra note 4, art. 5 (emphasis added) . 
104 Id. arts. 8, 9, 1 1 (3), 13, 14(1 ), 16(3), 17, 27, 34 and 36. 
105 In drawing up the Model Law, the Working Group and the Secretariat 
provided non-exhaustive lists of matters not governed by the Model Law and 
therefore appropriate as matters on which a court may intervene under Article 5 .  
Those lists included a number of  procedural 1natters, such as the fixing of  fees and 
costs and requests for deposits or security; consolidation of arbitral proceedings; 
enforcement by a court of interim measures of  protection ordered by the arbitral 
tribunal. See HOWARD M. HOLZiv! ANN & jOSEPH E.  NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON I NTERNATIONA L  COMlvfE RCI A L  ARBITRATION: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 218 (1989) . 
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can t'ventuelly, and only, be remitted to it after a final 
cwbitral award has been made . . . .  The Quebec Superior 
Court is not clothed with the power to examine [these 
questions] at this moment, but only once the final arbitral 
decision has been rendered.10o 
Arbitration legislation i n  other jurisdictions i.s similar in ci the1· 
excluding judicial supervision of arbitral procedu.xes, I07 or omitting 
any provision for interlocutory j udicial review or supervision of 
arbitrators' procedura I rulings.WR Similarly, one New Zealand 
Jllh Compilquie N<:�tionalc Air France v. Mbt�ye, f2000] R.j.Q. 717 (Can.). Se,· 
11/so Corporac1on Transne�cional de lnversiont:"s, S.A. v. STET lnt'l, S.P./\, l J99lJ] -15 
O.R.3ct 183, paw. 21 (Ce�n.) (''Article 5 of the Model Law expressly limils the scope 
for jLtdicial intervention except by application to set aside Lhe ;)Ward or to resist 
enforcement of an award under one or rnore of tbe limited groLtnds sp<:·citied In 
Articles 3-� or 36."). 
107 Arbitration Act, 1 996, c. 23, § l(c) (Eng.) ("in matters governed by tl1is Part 
the court should not intervene except as provided by this T-'ad')i lviEgKIN, supm 
note 23; See Elektrim SA v. Vivendi Universal SA l2007J EWJ IC 571, � 71 (Crn n•.) 
(Eng.) ("This is consistent with the general approach of lhe 1 996 Act, which is tu 
give as r:nuch power as po�sible to the parties and the arbitrators and to reduce the 
role of the courts to that of a supporter ., . .  ''), ld. ,l 67 ("[T]he underlying 
principles of the 1996 Act .. . [is] minimum of interference in the arbitral process 
by the courts, at least before an award is made"). The scope for the court to 
intervene by injunction before an award is made by arbitrators is very limited. See 
Hiscox Underwriting Ltd. v. Dickson Manchester & Co. [2004) EWHC 479 (Q.B.) 
(Eng.) (holding that the court me�y intervene when an arbitral tribunal's po\iv�r is 
ineffective); Vale do Rio Doce Navigacos SA v. Shanghai Bao Steel Ocerin 
Shipping Co., (2000) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (holding that the court did not 
have the power to permit service of an arbitration claim); see also ] .  Jarvis & Sons 
Ltd. v. Blue Circle Dartford Estates Ltd. [2007] B.L.R. 439 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (holding 
that the court lacks authority to review interim ruling by arbitral tribunal). 
Section l(c) of the English Arbitration Act, 1996, provides that English courts 
''should'' not-rather than "shall" or "may" not-intervene in arbitral 
proceedings. This is intended to preserve-in narrowly-cabined and exceptional 
circumstances- the inJ1erent judicial power to intervene to correct serious 
injustices. 
10s See, e.g., Judicial Code, arts. 1693-98 (Belg.) (providing that the patiies 
shall determine their own rules of procedure and the arbitrators may rule on their 
own jurisdiction)i Decree No. 81-500 of May 12, 1981, joumal Officiel de la 
Republique Franc;aise Q.O.] [Official Gazette of France], p. 1 3 98, reprinted iJI 
N.C.P.C. arts. 1460-68, 1494 (Fr.) (providing that arbitral tribunals are not 
governed by the procedure applicable to norm.al French courts); 
Zivilproze!Sordnung [ZPOJ § 1026 (F.RC.); Federal Statute on Prjvate 
International Law! Dec. lS, 1987, RS 291, arts. 180-187 (Switz.) (providing that the 
parties to the arbitration may select t11eir rules of procedures and that arbitrators 
may rule on their own jurisdiction); Arbitration Law, L?.IVl No. 138 of 2003, arts. 
25-35 Oapan) (providing that the parties to the arbitration are free to select their 
own rules of procedures so long as they do not offend Japanese public policy); 
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decision rejected both <:�n application to review cln arbitrator's 
interlocutory procedural directions and a requesL for a j udicizd 
order enforcing those d irections, making clear the court's 
11immedie1te reluctance to be used as a 'cuckoo' to be whistled ou t 
to exercise the coercive power of the State through its jud icia l  arm, 
but vvithout any ability to rnakc an adjudication upon the 
mattcr."I09 An English court adopted the same vievv, holding that 
the Engl ish Arbitration Act "conten1plates that once matters are 
refened to arbitration, i t  is the arbitral tribunal that wi 11 generally 
deed wiJh issues of their jurisdiction and the procedure in the 
arbitrotion up to a n  award.1' nu 
J n  the United States1 the statutory text of the FAA does not 
expressly provide for judicial non-interference in arbitral 
proceedings. Nonetheless, lower U.S. courts have repeatedly held 
that judicial in tervention in pending arbitral proceedings (both 
international and domestic) is improper to correct procedural 
errors or evidentiary rul ings.1 1 1  As one U.S. federal trial court 
Arbitration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'] People's Cong., Oct. 
31, 1994, effective Sept. l, 1995), arts. 39-57 (P.R. C.). 
H\'1 Weatherbend v. Oeka New Ze<lland Lld., [1997} 10 P.R.N.Z. 625, 631 (H.C. 
1997) (The judge we1s "loathe to add to an interminable procedural wrangle 
bet·ween these parties, but [was} not satisfied that it has been demonstrated thal l 
have the authority or jurisdiction to intervene in the way which is sought."), 
1 !(1 Elektrim SA v. Vivendi Universal SA [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 8, � 70 
(Comm.) (Eng.). See also Weatherhead v. Deka, [1997} 10 P.R.N.Z. at 631 (holding 
that courts cannot nom1ally intervene until an award has been made, whereafter, 
in appropriate cases, the award can be set aside and remitted to the arbitrators for 
rehearing). 
m See 2. BO�N, supra note 1, at 1780 (describing lack of interlocutory judicial 
review of a.rbitTal tribunal's discovery rulings in U.S. courts); see, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. 
Corp. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1973) ("[Jludicial 
review prior to the rendition of a final arbitration award should be indulged, ii at 
alJ, only in the most extreme cases."); Campania Panemen.a Maritima San 
Gerassimo, S.A. v. J. E. Hurley Lumber Co., 244 F.2d 286, 288-89 (2d Cir. 1957) 
(stating that "[ilt should not be the function of the District Court, after having 
ordered an arbitration to proceed, to hold itself open as an appellate tribunal to 
rule upon any questions of evjdence that may arise in the course of the 
arbitration" and noting that interlocutory judicial review of arbitrators' 
evidentiru·y rulings "result only in a waste of time, the interruption of the 
arbitration proceeding, ru1d encourages delaying tactics . . . .  "); Krauss Bros. 
Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, lnc. 62 F.2d 1004, 1.005 (2d Cir. 1933) ("The 
purpose of arbitration is essentially an escape from judicial trial . . . .  "); Banco! y 
CIA. S. En C. v. Bancolombia S.A., 123 F. Supp. 2d 771, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[Tlhe 
court's authority to direct or oversee [an) cYrbitration is narrowJy confined . . . .  In 
particular, [the court] has little or no power to afford interlocutory review of 
procedure1l matters, let a1one to determine at  the outset what procedural rules are 
io be applied.J')� foren10st Yarn Mills, Inc. v. Rose Mills, lnc., 25 f.R.D. 9, 1 1  (E.D. 
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dedan�d, " [ n]othing in the [FAA] conten1plates interference by the 
courl in an ongoing arbitration proceeding." m Or, as another 
court put it, to permit judicio\ review of arbi trators' intarlocutory 
rulings vvould he "unth.inkable.'' 1U 
National court decisions in leading civil law jurisdictions arc 
similar. 1 1 4  The Paris Cour d'appel has affirmed lhe principle of 
judicial non-in terference in emphatic terms, holding thal: 
The exercise of the prerogatives attached to the 
[, rbitrators' authority], which is legitimate and autonom.ous 
in its own right, must be guaranteed in a totally 
independent manner, as befjts any judge, without any 
Pa. 1960) ("[J]n ,) proceeding before arbitrators neither the statute nor the rules 
make available to any party thereto the discovery procedures provided in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Cavanaugh v. McDonnell & Co., 258 N.E.2d 
561, 564 (Mass. 1970) (to allow judicial review of interlocutory arbih·al rulings 
"would tend to render tJ1e proceedings neither one thing nor the other, but 
transform them into a hybrid, part judicial and part arbitrationt'll"); Mobil Oil 
Indonesia Inc. v. Asamera Oil (lndonesia) Ltd., 372 N.E.2d 2J, 23 (N.Y. 1977) 
("There is no authority for this court or any court to intervene at [the 
interlocutoryJ �tate of the progression of the arbitration proceeding. , .  for the 
court to entertain review of intermediary arbitration decisions involving 
procedure or �ny other interlocutory matter, would disjoint and unduly delay the 
proceedings, thereby thwarting the very purpose of conservation."); see also 
Tempo Shain Corp. v, Bertek, lnc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1 997) ("Federal courts 
do not superintend arbitration proceecf.ings. Our review is restricted to 
determining whether the procedure was fW1damentally unfair.") (quoting 
Teamsters, Local Union 657 v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 735 P.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 
1984)); UNlF. ARBITRATION ACT, § 18 cmt. 1,  7 lJ.L.A. 2 (2000) ("[Cjourts are very 
hesitant to review interlocutory orders of an arbitrator."). 
m Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Tnc., 685 F. Supp. 1 241, 1 242 
(S.D. Fla. 1988). 
m Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Adair, 218 A.2d 791, 794 (Pa. 1966). 
m See FrankfLu·ter Redaktion [BeckRS) June 28, 2006, 34 SchH 11/05 
(Obetlandesgericht Munich) (F.R.G.) ("Decisions of state courts in arbitral matters, 
in particular interference with pending arbitraJ proceedings, are not provided for 
by statute and inadmissible"); Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht [BayObLGZ] 
Oct. 5, 2004, 2004 Sd1iedsVZ 316, 317 (F.R.G.) (noting the "principle that Gennan 
courts do not take part in foreign arbitral proceedings"); Decisioni del Tribunale 
federaJe svizzero [DTF] T1I 492, Tribunale federale [Federal Tribunal] Nov. 1, 1996, 
122 (Switz..) (noting that the court's jurisdiction does not extend to examining 
procedural orders or directives which can be amended or overruled during the 
further course of the proceedings). See nlso PETROCHIL.OS, supra note 8, at 93 
("[m]odern arbitration law overwhelmingly takes the view that it is up to the 
parties and the tribunal to ens�llre the procedural propriety of the arbitral 
procedures in the first instance, for the whole of the duration of the arbitration. 
Lnstances of procedural misconduct will be censuxed after a final award has been 
made.")� A. BAU!vlBACH ET AL, ZIVJLPROZESSORDNUNG § 1026 (66th ed. 2008). 
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interference with the organization which set up the arbi tral 
tribunal and thus exhausted its powers, and ·without  anv 
intervention by the courts .ns 
There are only isolated exceptions to the principle of judic ia l  
non-interference, typical 1y  m i ll-considered lovver court 
decisions. 1 16 
The principle of judicial non-interference in international 
arbitral proceedings is vitally important . J udicial orders 
purporting to establish arbitral procedures would directly 
contradict the parties' objectives in agreeing to arbitrate ­
including particularly their desire for less formal and more flexible 
proced u rcs, their desire for a high degree of party control over 
such procedures, and their desire for "neutral" and expert a rbitral 
procedures a dopted by a tribunal of the parties' choice, rather than 
a national court. 1 1 7  Interlocutory judicial review of an arbitral 
tribunal's procedura l decisions would frustrate all of these 
objectives, while also in1 posing substantial risks of delay and 
appellate second-guessing on the arbitral process .ns 
These considerations go beyond matters of sound national 
legislative policy, reflecting the implied premises of an agreement 
to arbitrate international disputes . Absent express contractual 
provisions to the contrary, they are given effect by the New York 
Convention, which excludes interlocutory judicial involven1ent in 
procedural decisions in an ongoing international arbitration. As 
noted above, under Article II of the Convention (and similar 
provisions in other conventions), as well as under leading national 
arbitration regimes, the parties' agreement excluding interlocutory 
m Chambre arbitrale de Paris v .  Republique de Guinee, Paris Cour d'appel 
[CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Nov. 18, 1987, 1988 REV. ARB. 657. See also 
Tribunal de grande instance [T.G. I . ]  [court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Feb. 15, 
1995, 1996 REV. ARB. 503. 
116 See, e.g. ,  Tuesday Indus. v. Condor Indus., 1 978 (4) SA 379 (Prov. Divs.) at 
383 (S. Afr.) (claiming power to review procedural ruling of tribunal, but not 
exercising it); Windward Agency, Inc. v. Cologne Life Reins. Co., 123 Fed. App'x 
481, 483 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that an agreement to arbitrate does not comple tely 
oust a court of jurisdiction; rather, the court retains continuing supervision of 
arbitration to ensure that arbitration is conducted within a reasonable time) . 
117 See 2 BORN, supra note 1 ,  a t  1 785-92 (discussing the importance of arbitral 
tribunals' broad discretion over arbitral procedures) .  
1 1s  Interlocutory appeals are either unavailable or strictly limited in many 
judicial systems, precisely because of the delays that such appea ls cause to the 
litigation process. The same rationale applies to arbitration. 
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j udicial  i n terference in the arbitral p rocess is binding on 
Contracting States and their  courts .119  
7.  CONC LUSION 
The p rinciple  of  j u d icial  non-interference m international 
arbitral proceedings is  a centra l  pi l lar of contemporary 
international arbitration. Essential to the arbi tral process is the 
freedom of parties, and arbitra tors, to proceed with their chosen 
dispu te resolution mechanism to a final a ward, which only then 
may be subj ect to judicial review.  The existence of interlocutory 
chal lenges or appeals from arbitrators' p rocedural decisions \Nould 
have deeply damaging consequences for the arbitral process.  To 
prevent these consequences, b oth the New York Convention and 
other international arbitration conventions and national arbitration 
statutes e i ther expressly or implicitly adopt a princip l e  of j udicial 
non-interference in international arbitral proceedings. A l though 
seldom remarked upon, this p rinciple plays a central role in 
ensuring the efficacy of  the arbitral  process as a means of 
international dispute resolution. 
11 9  Sec supra notes 14-15 and acc01npanying text  (noting that  Article II of the 
Convention requi res courts of contracting states to refer parties to a v alid 
a rbitration a greement to arbitration pursuant to such agreement, if  necessary, and 
mu st uphold the agreement's  arbitral rules and procedures) .  
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